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Change of Venue in Criminal Trials:
Should Trial Courts Be Required to
Consider Demographic Factors When
Choosing a New Location for a Criminal
Trial?
I. Introduction
The May 1992 acquittal of four Los Angeles police officers accused
of beating motorist Rodney King attracted national attention.' The case
also raised a significant legal question, one which stems from the trial
court's decision to hold the trial in Ventura County.2 The change of venue
from racially diverse Los Angeles County to the more homogeneous
Ventura County significantly altered the racial composition of the jury
pool. 3 The issue arises whether a trial court, after granting a change of
venue in a criminal case, should be required to select a transferee forum
which is demographically similar to the location where the charges
originated.4
The Rodney King trial has prompted legislative proposals that call for
judicial consideration of demographic factors when selecting a new site for
a criminal trial after a court has determined that the defendant cannot
receive a fair trial in the county where the charges originated.5 This
1. See, e.g., Tom Mathews et al, The Siege of LA., NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1992, at 30 ("Denied
the justice they demanded for Rodney King, protesters and looters unleashed the deadliest riot in 25
years-and issued a wake-up call to the rest of America"). The state court trial of the officers
accused of beating Rodney King is discussed infra part M.A. The officers were subsequently tried
in federal court on charges arising from the Rodney King beating. In the federal proceeding two of
the four officers were convicted of violating Rodney King's civil rights.
2. After a change of venue motion is granted, the selection of the new forum is normally
within the discretion of the trial court. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
3. Los Angeles County's population is approximately 78% white and 13% African-American,
while the population in Ventura County is 92% white and 2% African-American. U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK, 1991 (1991) (percentages are as of
1985).
Some have contended that the trial court's selection of Ventura County determined the
outcome of the case. See, e.g., Assessing the Verdict And Its Legal Fallout, NAT'L L.J., May 11,
1992, at 15 (text of interview with Los Angeles attorney Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr.); Erwin
Chemerinsky, How a Fair Trial Produced An Unfair Verdict, CONN. L. TRIB., May 18, 1992, at 18.
Arguably, these contentions are supported by the May 1993 convictions of two of the four officers
on federal charges arising from the Rodney King beating. The federal trial was held in Los Angeles
County.
4. See, e.g., David Margolick, As Venues Are Changed, Many Ask How Important a Role Race
Should Play, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1992, at 7.
5. For discussion of legislation proposed in California and New Jersey see infa notes 169-
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Comment contends that demographic considerations should be one of the
factors evaluated by a trial court when selecting a new site for a criminal
trial.
By transferring a criminal trial to a forum which has significantly
fewer members of a minority group than that of the location where the
defendant was charged, the trial court may create the appearance that it is
discriminating on the basis of race, which in itself is sufficient to undermine
public confidence in the criminal justice system.6 Trial courts should
consider the effect that forum selection has on the racial makeup of the juror
pool-especially in the case of race-related crimes-in order to avoid the
appearance of racial discrimination and to maintain public confidence in our
system of justice.7
Part II of this Comment provides historical background on the concept
of venue. Part III identifies the scope of the problem of selecting a new site
for a criminal trial after a change of venue motion is granted, and illustrates
that an appearance of impropriety can manifest itself in two contexts. The
racial composition of the new forum may appear to be more or less
favorable to the defendant than the location where the charges originated.
Part IV discusses plausible constitutional limits on a state's ability to
affect the racial composition of juries. Part V evaluates legislative
proposals pending in New Jersey and California which would implement
judicial consideration of demographic factors in selecting a new forum after
a change of venue has been granted. Part VI offers suggestions concerning
the judicial consideration of demographic factors as a component of the
totality of circumstances which should be evaluated in selecting a new
forum.
172, 178 and accompanying text.
6. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that racial discrimination in the jury selection process
undermines public confidence in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 112
S. Ct. 2348. 2353-54 (1992) ("Selection procedures that purposefully exclude blacks from juries
undermine . . . public confidence-as well they should."). See also, Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct.
1364, 1371 (1991) ("[Rlacial discrimination in the selection of jurors 'casts doubt on the integrity
of the judicial process' and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt.") (quoting Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
7. The need for public confidence is especially high in cases involving race-
related crimes. In such cases, emotions in the affected community will be
heated and volatile. Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice
system is essential for preserving community peace in trials involving race-
related crimes.
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992).
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II. Historical Background on Venue
The term "venue" simply means the location where a lawsuit is
brought to trial.' Venue should be distinguished from "jurisdiction," which
refers to a court's "authority or power" to try a case.9 Venue must also be
distinguished from the concept of "vicinage," which refers to the place from
which the jurors are drawn.10
The modem concept of venue is the product of a common law rule
which deemed all criminal offenses as local, and therefore "subject to
prosecution only in the county where they were committed."" In early
English trials, jurors themselves were witnesses, and they rendered verdicts
based upon their own knowledge of the case.' 2 Consequently, jurors were
"summoned from the visne[,I or neighborhood[,]" from which the dispute
arose.' 3 Eventually, jurors were required to decide cases based upon the
testimony of witnesses other than themselves.1 4 This change
notwithstanding, at common law it remained important that the jurors be
drawn from the location where the dispute originated.'
Today, the proper venue for criminal trials is governed by statute,
though jurors continue to be summoned from the locality where the trial is
held.' 6 In federal prosecutions, venue is ordinarily proper in the district
where the offense was committed.' 7 In state prosecutions, proper venue
is usually in the county or parish where the crime was committed.'
8. Commonwealth v. Reilly, 188 A. 574, 579 (Pa. 1936).
9. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PRoCEDuRE § 16.1, at 334 (1984).
10. Id. Typically jurors are selected from the location where the trial is held, meaning that the
venue and vicinage coincide. See Id Moreover, "[Tihe venue-vicinage distinction often is not an
important one." Id





16. See 2 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, § 16.1, at 334-40.
17. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18 provides as follows: "Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by
these rules, the prosecution shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed." This rule
codifies the constitutional requirement that the defendant be tried in the state where the offense was
committed by an impartial jury of that district. United States v. Fry, 413 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D.
Mich. 1976), affid, 559 F.2d 1221 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978). See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 3 and U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Sometimes venue will be proper in more than one district, thus giving the government "a
choice as to where to bring the prosecution." 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, § 16.1, at 337.
This is usually the case where the crime is a continuing one, "either consisting of 'distinct parts'
or involving 'a continuously moving act."' Id. (quoting United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73
(1916)).
18. 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, § 16.1, at 340. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 910.03
(West 1985). As in federal prosecutions, see supra note 17, if the offense is a continuing one, there
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A criminal defendant can petition the court to change venue on
grounds that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the place where the
charges arose. 9 It is common for the defendant to argue that a fair trial
cannot be had because of a significant amount of pretrial publicity in the
locality where the offense occurred.20 The burden of proof is on the
defendant, as the party seeking a change of venue,21 to show that pretrial
publicity renders it impossible to have a fair trial.22 The decision whether
to grant or deny the change of venue motion is within the discretion of the
trial court.23 The trial court's ruling on the motion for change of venue
will be reversed only if there has been an abuse of discretion. 24
Once the trial court decides to change the venue of a criminal trial, it
is ordinarily within the discretion of the court to select a new location for
the trial.' Courts have considered a number of factors in selecting a
replacement forum. The list includes: (1) whether the new location is
convenient for the parties, witnesses and attorneys; 26 (2) whether a speedy
may be "several venue possibilities extending to all locales in which the crime was begun, continued
or completed." 2 LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note 9, § 16.1, at 340 (citing Commonwealth v. Libby,
266 N.E.2d 641 (Mass. 1971)).
19. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a) provides:
The court upon motion of the defendant shall transfer the proceeding as to that defendant
to another district whether or not such district is specified in the defendant's motion if the
court is satisfied that there exists in the district where the prosecution is pending so great
a prejudice against the defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial
at any place fixed by law for holding court in that district.
Similarly, state statutes typically allow for a change of venue when it appears that a fair trial cannot
be had in the forum where the charges were initiated. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1033(a) (West
1985) infra note 37.
20. CHARLEs E. TORCtA, 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 41, at 205-06 (13th ed. 1989).
See generally Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Case as Ground for
Change of Venue, 33 A.L.R.3d 17 (1970).
21. The prosecution may also seek a change of venue in a criminal case. See generally Erwin
S. Barbre, Annotation, Change of Venue by State in Criminal Case, 46 A.L.R.3d 295 (1972). On
when it is proper for a trial court to order a change of venue sua sponte, see Caroline Zane,
Annotation, Power of State Trial Court in Criminal Case to Change Venue on its Own Motion, 74
A.L.R.4th 1023 (1989).
22. See, e.g., Wansley v. Slayton, 487 F.2d 90, 94 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994
(1974). See also Guthrie, supra note 20, at 41 and cases therein cited.
23. See, e.g., Ehrlichman v. Sirica, 419 U.S. 1310, 1312 (1974). See also Guthrie, supra note
20, at 42-43 and cases therein cited.
24. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Daugherty, 426 A.2d 104, 105-06 (Pa. 1981). See also Guthrie,
supra note 20, at 43-45 and cases therein cited.
25. The trial court's discretion must be exercised within statutory limits. See, e.g., State v.
Thompson, 123 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1963). See also cases cited in Joseph T. Bockrath,
Annotation, Choice of Venue to Which Transfer is to be had, Where Change is Sought Because of
Local Prejudice, 50 A.L.R.3d 760, 773-75 (1973). It has been held that the trial court may permit
the parties to reach their own agreement on the new location of the trial, subject to the final approval
of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 99 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Ky. 1936).
26. United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 61-62 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936
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trial could be had in the new location; 27 (3) whether there is an easy
method of transportation to the new site;28 (4) whether prejudice is lacking
in the new location; 29 and (5) whether the trial could be held at a
comparatively low cost in the transferee county.3'
III. Scope of Problem
A trial court can undermine the public's confidence in the criminal
justice system when its selection of a new forum for a criminal trial creates
the appearance of racial discrimination. This Part explains that the
appearance of discrimination can arise in two contexts related to the trial
court's selection of a new forum. Subpart A presents the problem in the
context of a new forum which appears to be demographically more
favorable to the defendant than the original site. Subpart B demonstrates
the problem in the context of a new forum whose racial makeup appears to
be less favorable to the defendant than the original location.
A. The Rodney King Beating Trial
On the night of March 3, 1991, Los Angeles police stopped motorist
Rodney King for a traffic violation.3' Unbeknownst to the officers at the
scene, a local resident videotaped an eighty-one-second portion of the
events which followed.32 The violent images depicted on the videotape
attracted nationwide attention.33 The videotape "caused shock, revulsion,
(1972). See also Bockrath. supra note 25, at 779-82 and cases therein cited.
27. Zinn v. District Court in and for Morton County, 114 N.W. 472, 474 (N.D. 1908). See also
Bockrath, supra note 25, at 782 and cases therein cited.
28. Conn v. State, 158 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941) (condition of road to new
venue considered a factor). See also Bockrath, supra note 25, at 783.
29. San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & lrrig. Co., Inc. v. Stevinson, 178 P. 292, 294 (Cal.
1919). See also Bockrath, supra note 25, at 783 and cases therein cited.
30. See Kramer v. Heins, 158 N.W. 1061, 1062 (N.D. 1916). See also Bockrath, supra note
25, at 784-85 and cases therein cited.
31. According to the California Highway Patrol (CHP), King's car was traveling at 115 m.p.h.
when it passed a CHP patrol car on the Foothill Freeway. Hector Tobar & Richard L. Colvin,
Witnesses Depict Relentless Beating, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at BI. According to police, the CHP
patrol car began pursuit and summoned Los Angeles police when the chase entered into the
jurisdiction of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Id. According to police, King's car
travelled through red lights at speeds up to 80 m.p.h. before stopping on a four-lane highway in front
of an apartment complex. Id.
32. Mathews et al, supra note 1, at 31.
33. The tape was first played by a Los Angeles television station. Hector Tobar & Leslie
Berger, Tape of LA. Police Beating Suspect Stirs Public Furor, L.A. TIMES, March 6, 1991, at Al.
Within two days of the incident, the videotape was being broadcast nationwide by the Cable News
Network. Id. The videotape "depicts at least a dozen officers surrounding [Rodney King) after he
left his car, kicking him and inflicting more than 40 blows with nightsticks as he lay on the
pavement." Id.
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outrage and disbelief among viewers."'
The county of Los Angeles brought charges against four of the police
officers for assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury and other
related offenses.35 The incident was fraught with racial overtones because
all of the officers charged were white, while King was African-
American.36
The defendant officers moved for a change of venue due to the
extensive amount of pretrial publicity and the political turmoil caused by
the videotape.37 The trial court denied the motion, and the defendants
petitioned for pretrial appellate review.38 On appeal, the trial court's
ruling was reversed and the motion was granted. 39  The case was
remanded to the trial court for selection of a new site. °
Under California law, "[tihe decision of where to transfer the case
[after a change of venue motion has been granted] lies within the discretion
of the [trial] court, which must consider the 'interest of justice.".'4  The
34. Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
35. See id.
36. See Lou Cannon, Trial in Videotaped Beating of Motorist Opens Today, WASH. POST, Feb.
3, 1992, at A3 ("[Tihe highly publicized videotape has inflamed racial feelings in Los Angeles, where
members of the black and Hispanic communities said the incident reflects deep-seated attitudes of
prejudice in the Los Angeles Police Department.").
37. Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 781. Under California law the trial court shall order a change of
venue "[o]n motion of the defendant, to another county when it appears that there is a reasonable
likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county [where the action is pending]."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1033(a) (West 1985). See generally Guthrie, supra note 20.
38. Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
39. Id. at 788. The California Court of Appeal. Second District, emphasized that a change of
venue may not have been warranted if the case involved only "extraordinary publicity." Id. at 779.
The change of venue motion was granted because the videotape initiated a "high level of political
turmoil and controversy" which the court expected to continue up until the start of the trial. Id. The
court described the political factors as follows:
[Following the release of the videotape,] a political furor erupted which has been
compressed into an intense four month period. The Mayor called for the Chief [of Police]
either to resign or to retire. The Police Commission placed the Chief on inactive status;
he responded with a lawsuit. The City Council intervened reinstating the Chief. A power
struggle ensued among the Chief, the Mayor, the City Council and the Police
Commission.
Id. at 785.
The court concluded "there is a substantial probability Los Angeles County is so saturated with
knowledge of the incident, so influenced by the political controversy surrounding the matter and so
permeated with preconceived opinions that potential jurors cannot try the case solely upon the
evidence presented in the courtroom." Id. at 779. For an explanation of when pretrial publicity
constitutes a ground sufficient to grant a change of venue motion, see generally Guthrie, supra note
20.
40. Powell, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
41. People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865, 881 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (quoting McGown v. Superior
Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 262, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)). The procedure is governed by Rule 842 of the
California Rules of Court, which provides:
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defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the court's selection
of the new forum. 42 At the hearing, it is appropriate for the trial court to
consider evidence on the presence or absence of prejudice in a potential new
forum, as well as on the convenience or hardship associated with trying the
case in a potential new forum.4a The court is not required to compare the
racial composition of the possible new locations to that of the location
where the charges originated.
Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court moved the King trial
to Ventura County, "a community that is close to Los Angeles in distance
but a world away in lifestyle and racial composition."" Only about 2%
of Ventura County's population is African-American, whereas Los Angeles
County is approximately 11% African-American. 45  The other sites
considered were Alemeda County (18% African-American) and Riverside
County (5.5% African-American). 46 The trial court gave no reason for
rejecting Riverside County, but indicated that moving the trial
approximately 400 miles to Alemeda County would be too costly and
inconvenient for the parties involved.47
In selecting the new forum, the trial court did not consider the racial
composition of the new location.48 At trial, the four white police officers
were acquitted by a jury composed of ten white persons, one Hispanic
person, and one Asian person.49 The outcome of the trial sparked three
days of rioting and looting in Los Angeles.50 This case created the
[The trial court is required to] advise the Administrative Director of the Courts of the
pending transfer. Upon being advised the Director shall, in order to expedite judicial
business and equalize the work of the judges, suggest a court or courts that would not be
unduly burdened by the trial of the case. Thereafter, the court in which the case is
pending shall transfer the case to a proper court as it determines to be in the interest of
justice.
WEST ANN.CAL. 23, PT. 1, RULE 842.
42. Cooper, 809 P.2d at 881; McGown v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 262, 265 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977).
43. Cooper, 809 P.2d at 881; see McGown, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
44. Cannon, supra note 36, at A3.
45. See Cannon, supra note 36, at A3; Andrea Ford & Daryl Kelley, King Case to be Tried in
Ventura County, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at A3, A17. These articles do not disclose the source
of the demographic statistics reported. It is acknowledged that the demographic statistics in the
newspaper reports differ slightly from those presented in note 3, supra.
46. Timothy M. Phelps, The Judge Who Chose Simi Valley, NEWSDAY, May 14, 1992, at 5.
The Administrator of the courts originally suggested Alemeda County, Ventura County and Orange
County as possible new sites for the trial. Id. (This recommendation was made in accordance with
California Rules of Court, Rule 842. See supra note 41.) Subsequently, Riverside County was
substituted for Orange County, which experienced a shortage of vacant courtrooms. Phelps, supra.
47. Phelps, supra note 46, at 5.
48. Ford & Kelley, supra note 45, at A3.
49. Mathews et al, supra note 1, at 33.
50. Mathews et al, supra note 1, at 31.
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appearance that selection of the new forum without regard to racial
composition favorably benefitted the defendants.
B. Mallett v. Missouri
As can be expected, however, every venue change does not necessarily
benefit the defendant. Mallett v. Missouri" illustrates the problem of
selection of a new forum which appears to be less favorable to the
defendant than the original forum. In Mallett, the defendant was an
African-American man who was charged with the murder of a white police
officer in Missouri.52 The prosecution began in Perry County, where the
murder occurred. 53 That county had a total population of 16,784,
including 1,100 African-Americans.54 When the defendant requested a
change of venue, he also asked that the trial be transferred to a county
where African-Americans reside, and would be part of the juror pool.55
Both the prosecution and the'defense made recommendations to the
trial court regarding the appropriate county in which to hold the trial.56
The trial court transferred the case to Schuyler County, which had not been
recommended by either party.57 Schuyler County had a population of
4,964 whites and only 3 African-Americans, none of whom were present in
the county at the time of the trial.58
Mallett was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an all-
white jury.59 The Supreme Court of Missouri upheld Mallett's conviction
on direct appeal. 6° Mallett then sought state post-conviction relief on
grounds that the transfer to Schuyler County violated his due process and
equal protection rights.6' A special judge agreed with Mallett, and ordered
that he receive a new trial in a "venue where there is a possibility of blacks
being on the jury."'62 The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the ruling
51. 110 S. Ct. 1308 (1990)










60. State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
61. Mallett v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
62. Mallett v. State, 769 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Mo. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1308
(1990).
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of the special judge, and reinstated the original verdict.63
With three justices dissenting, the United States Supreme Court denied
review of the Mallett case." Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
authored a dissenting opinion in which he indicated that he would have
granted certiorari in order to decide whether the change of venue violated
Mallett's rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or under the Sixth Amendment's fair cross section
requirement. 65
IV. Constitutional Limits on a State's Ability to Affect the Racial
Composition of Juries
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the Sixth
Amendment's fair cross section requirement place limits upon a state's
ability to affect the racial composition of juries. This Part discusses those
restrictions and their possible application in the context of a change of
venue and concludes that these constitutional principles have little
applicability in change of venue cases.
A. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides: "No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In the context
of state actions affecting the racial composition ofjuries, the Supreme Court
has held that the Equal Protection Clause places constitutional restrictions
on state laws governing jury selection; 67 actions of state officials
responsible for summoning jurors;68 and the exercise of peremptory
63. Id. In denying Mallett's due process claim, the Court noted that there was no direct
evidence of juror prejudice against Mallett and refused to "infer racial prejudice on the part of a jury
which sentences a black killer of a white victim to death simply because that jury was drawn from
a county" where there are no African-American residents. Id. at 80. In rejecting Mallet's equal
protection claim, the Court held that there was no evidence of "discriminatory purpose" in the trial
court's selection of Schuyler county for Mallet's trial. The Court also determined that the selection
of a county where no African-Americans reside did not give rise to an "inference" of discriminatory
purpose. Id. at 80-81.
64. Mallett v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 1308 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
65. Id. at 1308.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that a state law which denies
African-American persons eligibility for jury service violates the Equal Protection Clause).
68. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (holding that the State may not deny African-
American persons eligibility for jury service on false assumption that all African-Americans are
unqualified to serve as jurors).
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challenges by the prosecutor in a criminal trial,69 by defense counsel in a
criminal trial7" and by private litigants in a civil case.71
1. Interests Protected by the Equal Protection Clause. --The seminal
case addressing equal protection and jury selection is Strauder v. West
Virginia, 72 decided by the Supreme Court in 1880. In Strauder, an
African-American man who had been convicted of murder in West Virginia
claimed that he was denied equal protection of the laws because the West
Virginia statute governing jury selection denied African-Americans
eligibility for membership on grand 73 or petit74 juries in state criminal
proceedings. 75  The Supreme Court instructed that the Fourteenth
Amendment was "designed to assure to [African-Americans] the enjoyment
of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons
... ,76 Moreover, the Court observed that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees African-American persons "the right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as [African-American]."7
The Court held that the West Virginia statute contravened these basic
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.78
The Court went on to identify two specific harms which result from
discriminatory jury selection practices. First, the Court recognized a
criminal defendant's right to have his grand and petitjuries selected without
discrimination against potential jurors of the defendant's race.79 Second,
69. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that race-based use of peremptory
challenges by a prosecutor in any single case violates the Equal Protection Clause).
70. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that race-based use of peremptory
challenges by defense counsel in a criminal trial violates the Equal Protection Clause).
71. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (holding that race-based
use of peremptory challenges by private litigants in a civil case violates the Equal Protection Clause).
* 72. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
73. A grand jury is an "accusatory" body of citizens whose duty it is to determine, after hearing
the prosecution's evidence, whether probable cause exists that a crime has been committed and
whether the accused should be indicted and held for trial. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 855 (6th ed.
1990). At common law, a grand jury was made up of twelve to twenty-three persons. Id. The term
"grand jury" derives from the fact that a grand jury is comprised of a greater number of persons than
a trial jury. Id.
74. "Petit jury" refers to an ordinary jury for a civil or criminal trial. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 856 (6th ed. 1990).
75. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879). The statute provided that "[a]ll white
male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to
serve as jurors. ." Id at 305.
76. Id. at 306.
77. Id. at 308.
78. Id. at 310.
79. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309 ("It is not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while every
white man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected ... without discrimination against his color, and
a [African-American) is not, the latter is equally protected by the law with the former.").
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the Court recognized that people who are excluded from eligibility for jury
service on the basis of race are denied the "privilege of participating
equally" in the administration of justice, resulting in a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.80  The Court's equal protection decisions following
Strauder have recognized a third harm caused by racial discrimination in
the selection of jurors. "The harm from discriminatory jury selection
extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to
touch the entire community."'', The Court has recognized that purposeful
discrimination in the selection of jurors "undermines public confidence in
the fairness of our system of justice. 82
However, the Equal Protection Clause does not entitle a criminal
defendant to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of the
defendant's own race. 3 Rather, the Equal Protection Clause entitles a
criminal defendant to be tried by a jury whose members are selected by
nondiscriminatory criteria."
2. Prima Facie Equal Protection Violation.--In order to establish a
prima facie case of an Equal Protection Clause violation on the basis of race
one must show that the state 5 has purposefully discriminated against
members of a distinct racial group.86 Proof of longstanding systematic
exclusion of group members from the jury selection process raises an
inference of purposeful discrimination, and therefore establishes a prima
facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 7
80. Id. at 308.
81. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986).
82. Id at 87; See also Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
83. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (1991) (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
84. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1367; Baison, 476 U.S. at 85.
85. State action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment can occur in many forms,
as indicated below:
A state acts by its legislature, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no
other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State,
or officers or agents by whom its powers are executed shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Ex Paste Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880). In recent years, the Supreme Court has construed
the "state action" requirement broadly in the context of the Equal Protection Clause. See Georgia
v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354-57 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant's exercise of
peremptory challenges constitutes state action for equal protection clause purposes); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083-87 (1991) (holding that a private litigant's exercise
of peremptory challenges constitutes state action for equal protection clause purposes).
86. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,494-95 (1977); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,478-
79 (1954) ("Whether such a [distinct] group exists within a community is a question of fact.")
(holding that Mexican Americans are a distinct class).
87. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241
(1976). In Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881), the defendant's equal protection claim had been
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Where there is less than total exclusion of an identifiable group from
participation as jurors, a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination can
be established by "the totality of relevant facts."88 A showing that state
action has a disproportionate impact on an identifiable group is
evidence-though not conclusive evidence-of discriminatory purpose.89
The Court, however, has found that the Equal Protection Clause is violated
when (1) the state's jury selection procedures make it easy "for those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate,"90 and (2) a
disproportionate impact is established.9'
One case held to have met these two criteria is Whitus v. Georgia,
92
decided in 1967 by the Supreme Court.93 The petitioner in Whitus claimed
that the state violated the Equal Protection Clause in the selection of the
venires' for his grand and petit juries.95 The jury list had been compiled
in part from the county's tax register, which contained the notation "(c)"
next to the names of all African-American taxpayers.96 The county
conceded that 27.1% of the county's taxpayers were African-American, yet
the petitioner's grand jury venire was only 9.1% African-American and his
petit jury venire was only 7.8% African-American. 97
The Court held that these facts alone were sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.9" The Court emphasized
rejected in the Delaware courts despite uncontradicted evidence that no African-American person
"had ever been summoned as a juror in the courts of the state." Id. at 394. The Delaware courts
relied on the state's race-neutral jury selection statute, Id. at 389, and on the "presumption" that the
state's jury selection officers had properly exercised their judgment to determine that "the [African-
American] race in Delaware were utterly disqualified, by want of intelligence, experience, or moral
integrity, to sit on juries." Neal, 103 U.S. at 397. The Supreme Court flatly refused to adopt the
same "violent presumption." Id. The record showed that the African-American population in
Delaware exceeded 20,000 in 1870 and 26,000 in 1880, while the state's total population was only
150,000. Id. The Court held the uniform exclusion of African-American persons from jury service
in a state where there was such a significant African-American population established a prima facie
case of discrimination on the part of the state officers charged with the duty of summoning jurors.
Id.
88. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94; Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
89. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94; Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
90. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953).
91. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967);
Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
92. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
93. See also, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
94. The "venire" is a jury panel, a group of citizens summoned to court from whom a petit jury
is selected in a given case. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990).
95. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 546 (1967).
96. ld at 549.
97. Id. at 550.
98. Id. at 551.
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that use of the tax register with racial designations created the "opportunity
to discriminate."" The disproportionate impact on the number of African-
American jurors on the grand and petitjury venires raised the inference that
the jury commissioners "resorted to" discrimination.' °
Once a prima facie case of discrimination is established, the burden of
proof shifts to the state to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional
discrimination by showing that race-neutral criteria and procedures actually
produced the disproportionate result.' 0 In Whitus, the evidence put on
by the state consisted of the jury commissioners' testimony that "no one
was included or rejected on the jury list because of race or color."' 2 The
Court rejected this testimony as insufficient to overcome the petitioner's
prima facie case.10 3  The Court has long held that "the State cannot
[satisfy its] burden [of proof] on mere general assertions that its officials did
not discriminate or that they properly performed their official duties."'
4
3. Equal Protection and Peremptory Challenges. --In recent years the
Supreme Court has greatly expanded the scope of the protection offered by
the Equal Protection Clause in the context of jury selection procedures. In
Batson v. Kentucky," the Court held that a prosecutor violates the Equal
Protection Clause by using peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner." In Powers v. Ohio,'0 7 the Court determined
99. It. at 552.
100. Whitus, 385 U.S. at 552.
101. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493-92; Washington, 426 U.S. at 241.
102. Whitus, 385 U.S. at 551.
103. Id
104. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94; Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 498 n.19; Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24,
25 (1967); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935).
105. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
106. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The true import of Batson is that it permits a criminal defendant
to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination based solely on the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. Id. Twenty-one years prior to Batson, the Court
indicated that a prima facie case of discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges required
evidence that the prosecutor struck African-American persons from venires in case after case. Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965). In Batson, the court recognized that this evidentiary standard
placed a "crippling burden of proof" on the defendant and rendered the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges "largely immune" from constitutional scrutiny. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
In Batson, the Court restated the showing required in order to establish a prima facie equal
protection violation in the context of peremptory challenges. Id. at 96. First, the defendant must
show that he is a member of a "cognizable racial group" and that "the prosecutor has exercised
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race." Id. Second,
the defendant is permitted to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges are a jury selection practice
that permits "'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate."' Id. (quoting Avery v.
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). Finally, "the defendant must show that these facts and other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor" used peremptory strikes to exclude
jurors on account of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The Batson requirement that the defendant
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that a white criminal defendant has standing to object to a prosecutor's
racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to strike African-
American jurors.'08  In Georgia v. McCollum,1°9 the Court held that
defense counsel's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in a criminal
trial violates the Equal Protection Clause.'10 Finally, in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.,"' the Court determined that the race-based
use of peremptory challenges in a civil case violates the equal protection
rights of the excluded jurors.
1 2
4. Possible Application in Change of Venue Cases. --An argument can
be made that the Equal Protection Clause also places limits on a trial court's
selection of a new site for trial after a change of venue motion is
granted.1 3 Theoretically, application of equal protection principles in the
context of a venue change would protect the same interests that are guarded
and the excluded juror share the same race was abrogated in Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
Once a prima facie case is established the burden of proof shifts to the prosecutor to provide
a race-neutral explanation for striking members of the cognizable racial group. Batson, 476 U.S. at
97. The "prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause." Id. However, the prosecutor may not merely assert that the challenged jurors could not be
impartial because they share the same race as the defendant. Id
107. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
108. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991) (holding that the white defendant had third-
party standing to assert the equal protection rights of the excluded African-American jurors).
109. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
110. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357 (1992). The Court jumped two significant
hurdles to reach this conclusion. First, the Court determined that defense counsel's use of peremptory
challenges constitutes "state action" within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 2354-
56. The Court reached this determination by reasoning that the peremptory challenge system (1) has
its source in state authority, (2) could not exist without government participation and (3) performs
a traditional government function. Id The Court also indicated that because peremptory challenges
take place in the court room, they are readily characterized as state action, I. at 2356.
Second, the Court held that the prosecutor has standing to object to defense counsel's
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357. The Court determined
that the prosecutor has third-party standing to raise a claim on behalf of the excluded jurors because
(1) the prosecutor has suffered a "concrete injury," (2) the prosecutor has a close relation to the third
party, and (3) there is some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect its own interests, hId
The Court found that the state suffered a "concrete injury" because racial discrimination in jury
selection undermines "the fairness and integrity of its own judicial process." Id. The prosecutor's
close relation to the excluded juror was established through voir dire which permits the state to
'"establish a relation, if not a bond of trust, with the jurors."' hI. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.
Ct. 1364, 1372 (1991)). Finally, the Court indicated that there are significant barriers to the excluded
juror bringing a suit on his own behalf. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357. For a summary of the
barriers to suit for an excluded juror see Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373.
111. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
112. 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991).
113. See Mallett v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 1308 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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by the Equal Protection Clause in other stages of the jury selection
process." 4 Yet in practice the application of equal protection principles
to change of venue situations is problematic.
A trial court's change of venue decision can be evaluated using the
Court's equal protection analytical framework." 5  The state action
requirement is satisfied, in that the trial court determines the new location
for trial after a change of venue motion is granted." 6 Moreover, the trial
court's considerable discretion in determining the new venue provides the
opportunity to discriminate."I7  A venue change to a forum where there
are significantly fewer members of a recognized racial group could give rise
to prima facie case of discrimination." 8 The burden of proof would then
shift to the trial court to provide a race-neutral explanation for its selection
of the new site for trial. 19
At this point application of equal protection principles to a venue
change becomes troublesome. In many instances the trial court will be able
to provide a race-neutral explanation for its choice of venue because of the
variety of factors which are normally considered in selecting a new site for
trial. 2 For example, assuming that at least one of these factors is
present, the trial court can indicate that its decision is based on: convenience
of the parties, witnesses and attorneys; the ability to have a speedy trial in
the new location; ease of transportation to the new situs; the absence of
prejudice in the new venue; or the low cost associated with holding the trial
at the selected forum.1
2 '
114. These interests are: (1) the criminal defendant's interest in having his jury selected by non-
discriminatory criteria, (2) the potential juror's interest in participating in the administration ofjustice,
and (3) the state's interest in maintaining the public's confidence in the administration ofjustice. See
supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
115. Mallett v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
116. That a trial court judge, as a member of the judiciary, is a state actor is beyond question.
See supra note 85.
117. Mallett v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (1990) (Marshall, J. dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Regarding the trial court's discretion in selecting a new forum, see supra notes 25-30 and
accompanying text.
118. See id. at 1309.
119. See id. at 1309.
120. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
121. However, it appears that the trial court in Mallett v. Missouri would have had difficulty
describing its selection of forum in race-neutral terms. In Mallett, the trial of an African-American
man accused of murdering a white police officer was moved from a county that was approximately
7% African-American in population to a county where only three African-American persons lived,
none of whom were present in the county at the time of the trial. See id The findings of a special
judge indicated that "counties which were of equal convenience to witnesses; equally free of pre-trial
publicity; of equal, greater or less distance; and included [African-Americans] were tendered by the
defense and prosecution." Mallett v. State, 769 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Mo. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied,
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Application of equal protection principles to the action of a trial court
in selecting a new forum will seldom be successful. Even where the
defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, an Equal
Protection Clause violation will not be found unless the trial court is unable
to articulate a race-neutral explanation for its choice of venue."2 Thus,
application of equal protection principles to a trial court's choice of forum
provides speculative or dubious protection against the appearance of racial
discrimination, which can arise when a trial is transferred to a forum which
has far-fewer minorities than the location where the charges originated.
23
Another factor militates against application of equal protection
principles in the context of venue changes. Arguably, a change of venue
does not actually deny anyone the opportunity to serve as a juror. Assume,
for example, that a trial court considers counties A, B and C as possible
sites for a trial. It may be argued that potential jurors in counties A and B
are the victims of purposeful discrimination if county C is selected. If this
is the case, each and every venue change results in purposeful
discrimination against potential jurors in counties considered but not
selected. Yet, potential jurors in the unselected counties continue to have
the opportunity to participate in the administration of justice as jurors in
trials which take place in those counties.
This result differs substantially from a typical Equal Protection Clause
violation where discriminatory jury selection procedures deny members of
minority groups their only opportunity to participate as jurors in the
administration of justice124 The change of venue context also differs
from the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, where the victim of
110 S. Ct. 1308 (1990).
122. In the trial of the officers accused of beating Rodney King the trial court could have
suggested at least two race-neutral factors for its venue selection. First, of the locations considered,
Ventura County was the closest to Los Angeles, making it the most convenient and least costly
alternative. See Phelps, supra note 46, at 5. Second, the Ventura County courthouse in Simi Valley
was new and half-empty, making it a place where a speedy trial could be had. See Richard Perez-
Pena, Judge in Police-Beating Trial Sets Aside Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992, at B8.
123. The reaction of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
to the choice of venue for the Rodney King trial is evidence of the affect that choice of forum can
have on the public's perception of the fairness of the criminal justice system. The president of the
Ventura County chapter of the NAACP issued a letter which stated, '[it is a slap in the face to
have the Rodney King case tried in Ventura County."' Adrianne Goodman, NAACP Official
Criticizes Venue Change In King Case, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, at B3. The letter also
characterized Ventura County as '"the home breeding ground for the David Dukes, Tom Metzgers
and skinheads of America."' Id The NAACP had so little confidence in Ventura County as the site
for the King trial that it sent two or more of its representatives to observe each day of the trial "to
ensure that a fair hearing is conducted." Carlos V. Lozano, NAACP To Monitor Trial of 4 Officers,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1992, at B1.
124. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
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discrimination is clearly identifiable.' 25 This suggests that equal
protection principles may not have application in the context of venue
changes.
Moreover, even if equal protection principles are applied in the
context of venue changes, a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection
Clause can be rebutted easily if the trial court offers race-neutral reasons for
its selection of the new site. Thus, in the context of venue changes, equal
protection principles would do little to avoid the appearance of racial
discrimination created when a criminal trial is transferred to a forum that
has a significantly different racial composition than that of the location
where the charges originated.
B. Fair Cross Section Requirement
In addition to equal protection rights, criminal defendants have a Sixth
Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community. 26 The fair cross section requirement means that the jury list
must be fairly representative of the community, thus permitting the jury to
be "drawn from" a fair cross section of the community. 27 However, the
jury itself need not "mirror the community and reflect the various
distinctive groups in the population."'' 28  Thus, the fair cross section
requirement does not entitle criminal defendants to ajury of "any particular
composition."
1 29
125. In Powers v. Ohio, the Supreme Court commented:
It is suggested that no particular stigma or dishonor results if a prosecutor uses the
raw fact of skin color to determine the objectivity or qualifications of a juror. We do not
believe a victim of the classification would endorse this view; the assumption that no
stigma or dishonor attaches contravenes accepted equal protection principles.
A prosecutor's wrongful exclusion of a juror by a race-based peremptory challenge is a
constitutional violatioa committed in open court at the outset of the proceedings. The
overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt over the obligation of the
parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the
cause.
111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370-71 (1991).
126. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .. " U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. While not explicit in the text of the Sixth Amendment, the fair cross section requirement "is
derived from the traditional understanding of how an 'impartial jury' is assembled." Holland v.
Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 807 (1990). This understanding contemplates a venire which is
representative of the community. Id
127. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 807
(1990).
128. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
129. Id.; Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 (1947); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413
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In Taylor v. Louisiana,3 ' the Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment's fair cross section requirement is binding upon the states by
virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. t31  The
fair cross section requirement is designed to protect the primary purpose of
a trial by jury-the courtroom presence of the "commonsense judgement of
the community" as a check against the arbitrary use of power by the
prosecutor or the judge. 132  In Taylor, the Court instructed that this
purpose cannot be served if the jury pool is stripped of large distinctive
groups of the population. 33 Moreover, the Court emphasized that
community participation in the administration of justice is "critical" to
maintaining "public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
system."' ' 4
1. Prima Facie Fair Cross Section Violation. --A defendant establishes
a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement by satisfying a
three-prong test. 35 First, the defendant must establish that the allegedly
excluded group is a "distinctive" group in the community. 136 The second
prong requires proof that representation of the group in jury pools or venires
has not been "fair and reasonable" in relation to the number of group
members in the community. 37 Finally, the party making the claim must
show that the underrepresentation of the group is due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. 3 Once a prima facie
violation of the fair cross section requirement has been established, the
(1972).
130. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
131. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537-38. Seven years prior to its decision in Taylor, the Court held that
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). For many years prior to the decision in
Taylor, the Court's decisions reflected the notion that the American tradition of trial by jury
contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130 (1940) ("It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of
public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community.").
132. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
136. Id. at 364.
137. Id.
138. Id. The person claiming a fair cross section violation does not have to prove that the state
intentionally or purposely excluded members of a distinctive group in order to establish a prima facie
case. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 510 (1977) (Powell, J. dissenting) ("[A] defendant
need only show that the jury selection procedure 'systematically exclude[s] distinctive groups in the
community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonably representative thereof."') (emphasis added) (quoting
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 371
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[u]nder Sixth Amendment analysis intent [to discriminate] is
irrelevant ....").
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burden of proof shifts to the state to demonstrate that a significant state
interest justifies the constitutional infringement. 3 9
In Duren v. Missouri,"4° the Supreme Court applied the three-prong
fair cross section analysis to invalidate Missouri's jury selection system
which resulted in underrepresentation of women in the jury pool.'4' The
petitioner in Duren was a man who had been convicted of first degree
murder in Missouri. 42 The petitioner satisfied the first prong of the fair
cross section analysis by alleging that women are a "distinctive" group in
the community, 43 and satisfied the second prong of the test by showing
that the percentage of women on jury venires (15%) did not reasonably
represent the percentage of women in the community (54%).'44 Finally,
the petitioner satisfied the third prong of the analysis by a statistical
showing that the underrepresentation occurred "not just occasionally" but
"in every weekly venire for a period of nearly a year."' 45 Thus, the Court
concluded that the exclusion of women was systematic and inherent in
Missouri's jury selection procedures.""
Once the petitioner established a prima facie violation of the fair cross
section requirement, the burden of proof shifted to the state to come forward
with a significant state interest to justify the disproportionate result.
47
The state contended that the automatic exemption for women furthered the
state's interest "safeguarding the important role played by women in home
and family life."' 4  While the Court recognized this as an important state
139. Duren, 439 U.S. at 367.
140. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
141. The Missouri jury selection system permitted women to "opt out" of jury service by
returning the juror questionnaire sent to all potential jurors. Duren, 439 U.S. at 361. Any woman
desiring to "opt out" simply had to indicate on the questionnaire that she had elected not to serve.
111
142. Id. at 360. A criminal defendant has standing to allege noncompliance with the fair cross
section requirement, whether or not he is a member of the allegedly excluded group. Id at 359 n.1;
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975); Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 805 (1990).
143. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. The Court noted that the first prong of the test was satisfied by
the Court's decision in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). In Taylor, the Court recognized
women as a "distinctive" group and held that Louisiana's jury selection procedures systematically
excluded women from jury service in violation of the fair cross section requirement. Id at 537.
Under the jury selection system invalidated in Taylor, women were ineligible for jury service unless
they "opted in" by filing a written declaration with the clerk of the court. Id at 523.
144. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364-66.
145. Id. at 366.
146. Id at 366-67. The Court relied in part on the fact that women were given a second
opportunity to "opt out" at the summons stage. Id. Furthermore, Missouri's system presumed that
women who did not respond to the summons had claimed exemption from service. Id at 367. As
a result, the percentage of women on venires (14.5%) was substantially less than the percentage of
women who had received summonses (26.7%). Duren, 439 U.S. at 367.
147. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1979).
148. Id. at 369.
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interest, it held that Missouri's automatic exemption provision was
unconstitutional because it swept too broadly.
49
2. Possible Application in Change of Venue Cases. --The application
of the fair cross section requirement in the context of venue changes
depends upon "which community defines the relevant universe for Sixth
Amendment purposes."'"0 Thus, the fair cross section requirement would
apply in the context of a venue change only if a criminal defendant is
entitled to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community residing
where the charges originate. However, the fair cross section requirement
would have no applicability to change of venue cases if the relevant
community for fair cross section purposes resides where the trial is held.
No courts have directly addressed this issue, 15' but some have focused on
the fair cross section requirement in related contexts.
In Sanders v. State,152 the trial court granted the defendant's motion
for a change of venue due to extensive pretrial publicity.153 On appeal,
the defendant claimed that he was denied a trial by an impartial jury
because the trial was moved to a county containing a very small percentage
of minority residents.154  The court rejected the defendant's claim,
implying that the trial court's single action of selecting a new forum does
not constitute a "systematic" exclusion of potential minority jurors.
55
Sanders suggests that a trial court's action in selecting a new site does not
constitute a "systematic exclusion" even if the county where the charges are
initiated is the "relevant universe" for fair cross section purposes.'
56
Moreover, Sanders implies that a fair cross section violation cannot occur
149. Id. ("[E]xempting all women because of the preclusive domestic responsibilities of some
women is insufficient justification for their disproportionate exclusion on jury venires.").
150. Mallett v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
151. Cf. Lewis L. Douglas, Race, Jury Composition And Change of Venue Applications, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 1, 1992, at 1, 4.
152. 230 N.W.2d 845 (Wis. 1975).
153. Sanders v. State, 230 N.W.2d 845, 855-56 (Wis. 1975).
154. Id. at 855. Although the opinion describes the defendant's appeal only as a claim of denial
of an impartial jury, it seems that it was the equivalent of a fair cross section claim in that the fair
cross section requirement derives from the traditional understanding of how an impartial jury is
assembled. See supra note 126.
155. Sanders v. State, 230 N.W.2d 845, 855 (1975). The court relied on the following passage:
-[A] defendant may not, for example, challenge the makeup of a jury merely because no members
of his race are on the jury, but must prove that his race has been systematically excluded."' id.
(quoting Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972)).
156. In order to establish a fair cross section violation, the party making the claim must prove
that underrepresentation of a distinctive group results from "systematic exclusion" of the group in
the jury selection procedure. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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in the context of a change of venue.'57
One state has adopted a common law rule for application in change of
venue cases. New York courts have held that "within reasonable limits, the
community to which the trial is transferred should reflect the character of
the county where the crime was committed."'58 However, the New York
courts have not explicitly stated that this rule stems from the fair cross
section requirement. Instead, the New York courts have indicated that the
rule is designed to insure that the party seeking the transfer does not "obtain
a more favorable tribunal."' 59
The New York rule is an appropriate method of evaluating a new site
for a criminal trial. The rule recognizes that a change of venue is granted
only because there is a likelihood that the defendant cannot receive a fair
and impartial trial in the county where the charges are filed."6 Thus, the
overriding concern in selecting a new forum should be obtaining a "neutral
forum.''. Moreover, the New York rule recognizes that selecting a new
forum is a "delicate and difficult task."' 62 Thus, the rule wisely does not
mandate transfer to a forum which mirrors the original forum
demographically. Instead, it requires that "within reasonable limits" the
two fora should be of the same character. 63
It appears that the fair cross section requirement will have applicability
in the context of venue changes only if the community in which the
defendant is charged is the relevant forum for fair cross section
purposes.'6 Application of the fair cross section requirement to venue
changes also requires the courts to recognize the 'single' act of transferring
a case from a racially diverse county to a homogeneous county as a
157. See also Keys v. Hey, 260 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1979) (Trial court did not abuse discretion
in refusing to consider demographic factors in choosing a new site for the trial after granting
defendant's change of venue motion. A 5.3% disparity between African-American population in
original forum and new forum does not constitute systematic exclusion of African-American persons
from jury participation and did not deny defendant her right to an impartial jury.).
158. People v, Goldswer, 350 N.E.2d 604, 608 (N.Y. 1976).
159. Id. at 608. For an application of the New York rule see People v. Boudin, 457 N.Y.S.2d
302, 307-08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (Defendant is not entitled to new forum which is more diverse
than county where charges were initiated. Orange County selected as transferee forum because it
provides a "convenient, nearby locale and provides an opportunity for adequate security for the trial."
County where charges were initiated and Orange County have "populations of almost identical size,
with racial and age breakdowns which are markedly similar.").
160. See People v. Goldswer, 350 N.E.2d 604, 608 (1976).
161. See id.
162. People v. Boudin, 457 N.Y.S.2d 302, 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); see People v. Goldswer,
350 N.E.2d 604, 608 (N.Y. 1976).
163. Goldswer, 350 N.E.2d at 608; Boudin, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
164. See supra text accompanying note 150.
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'systematic' exclusion of potential minority jurors. 65 Because no courts
have addressed these issues directly, it is uncertain whether the fair cross
section requirement has application in change of venue cases.
C. Summary: Constitutional Limits
In summary, I suggest that equal protection principles would have only
limited usefulness if applied in the context of venue changes.
166
Additionally, it is unclear whether the fair cross section requirement has any
applicability in change of venue cases.1 67 Therefore, I contend that the
criteria to be evaluated by a trial court when selecting a new forum should
be governed by the common law' 6 or appropriate legislation.
V. Legislative Proposals
The verdict in the Rodney King trial prompted legislative proposals for
change in the criteria used in selecting a new forum for trial after a change
of venue motion has been granted. This Part evaluates the proposals
introduced in the New Jersey and California Senates.
A. The New Jersey Proposal
New Jersey Senate Bill 828'69 requires that in every criminal trial
where a change of venue is granted, the new forum must have a "racial,
ethnic, economic and demographic composition" which is comparable to
the forum where the charges originated.170 The New Jersey proposal is
silent on considerations which have traditionally guided trial courts in
selecting transfer venues.
17 1
The New Jersey Senate Bill places too much weight on demographic
considerations.1 72 It creates a rigid rule that does not provide trial courts
with sufficient flexibility to weigh the various interests involved in each
case. Legislation should recognize that not every case will present
circumstances such that the public's confidence in the court system will be
undermined if the original forum and the new forum are not
165. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying note 122.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
168. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
169. New Jersey Senate Bill 828 provides: "Whenever a motion is granted in a criminal case for
a change of venue... the assignment judge of the county in which the indictment was found or the
accusation filed shall cause that case to be transferred to a county with a comparable racial, ethnic,
economic and demographic composition . 5..." S  828, 205th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1992).
170. See supra note 169.
171. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 169.
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demographically similar.
Trial courts should exercise flexibility in placing greater or lesser
weight on demographic considerations depending on the facts of each
particular case. For example, in cases involving race-related crimes,
demographic factors should be accorded great weight in determining a new
site for the trial. However, in cases not imbued with racial overtones,
demographic factors should be weighed against other relevant factors such
as distance to the new forum, convenience and cost.
B. The California Proposal
California Senate Bill 15917 provides that a trial court may hold an
evidentiary hearing before determining the appropriate county for the trial
to take place. 74  At the evidentiary hearing, the parties may present
evidence concerning the constitutionally cognizable demographic
characteristics of the potential new sites for trial. 175 The parties are also
permitted to present evidence concerning: (1) the extent of pretrial
publicity at each proposed location, (2) the burden imposed on each
potential forum, (3) the hardship imposed on the parties, witnesses and
other interested persons with respect to each proposed site, and (4) any
other factors relating to the fairness of the trial. 76 Finally, the California
173. California Senate Bill 159 provides in pertinent part:
(2) Whenever a change of venue is ordered pursuant to this subdivision, the
superior court in the county of original venue may conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine to which county . . . the cause should be transferred. The venue shall be
moved to a county where a fair and impartial trial can be had.
During the hearing, the parties may introduce evidence pertaining to all of the
following:
(A) ....
(B) The demographic characteristics of the county or counties in which the
[transferee] court or courts are located .... For purposes of this section, "demographic
characteristics" means criteria that are constitutionally cognizable in the formation of jury
panels, such as gender and race.
(C) The nature and extent of pretrial publicity, if any, in the county or counties in
which the court or courts suggested ... are located.
(D) The relative burden imposed on the [transferee] court or courts ....
(E) The relative hardship imposed on the parties, witnesses, and other interested
parties with regard to the [transferee] court or courts ....
(F) Any other factors which are relevant to the fairness and impartiality of the trial.
The decision of the superior court in the county of original venue . . . shall be
subject to review upon petition by the defendant.
S. 159, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993).
174. See supra note 173.
175. See supra note 173.
176. See supra note 173.
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proposal permits the defendant to seek appellate review regarding the trial
court's choice of venue.'"
The California proposal is an appropriate method of requiring trial
courts to evaluate demographic factors in considering a new site for trial.
Unlike the New Jersey proposal, 78 the California proposal does not create
a rigid rule requiring transfer to a site of similar demographic composition
regardless of the circumstances. Instead, the California proposal permits the
trial court to consider all relevant factors in light of the particular
circumstances presented. Moreover, the provision permitting the defendant
to seek appellate review of the trial court's decision is an appropriate
method of ensuring that the trial court evaluates all relevant evidence
presented by the parties.
To summarize, due to the uncertainty of application of constitutional
principles in the context of venue changes, legislation is an appropriate
method of introducing demographic considerations into the mix of factors
that a trial court should evaluate when selecting a new site for a trial.
However, legislation should not create a rigid rule requiring demographic
similarity between the original forum and the new forum regardless of the
circumstances presented. Instead, the trial court should retain discretion to
weigh demographic considerations against other relevant factors, 79 taking
into account all of the circumstances presented in each particular case.
VI. Suggestions Regarding Judicial Consideration of Demographic
Factors
Trial courts should be required to consider demographic factors prior
to selecting a new forum after a change of venue is granted in a criminal
trial. However, the demographic composition of the transferee forum
should be only one of the factors in the totality of circumstances evaluated
by the trial court. Other relevant factors that should be evaluated with
respect each potential forum include: convenience of the parties, attorneys,
and witnesses; the ability to obtain a speedy trial; distance from the original
forum; and absence of prejudice against the defendant.8
The totality of circumstances should also include an assessment of the
particular facts surrounding each case. In cases involving race-related
crimes, demographic considerations should be accorded great weight in
selecting a new site for trial. Racially motivated crimes attract a great
177. See supra note 173.
178. See discussion supra Part V.A.
179. For other relevant factors that should be considered see supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text.
180. Supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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amount of public attention. Transferring the trial to a forum with a
significantly different demographic composition than that of the original
site will affect the public's perception of the fairness of the criminal justice
system."8' Seeking a demographically similar transferee forum will help
to uphold the public's confidence in the integrity of the jury system.
Implementation of a rigid rule requiring demographic similarity
regardless of the circumstances is undesirable."' Selection of a new
forum for criminal trial is a "delicate and difficult task" ' 3 which requires
a balancing of all of the interests involved. Necessarily, a great amount of
discretion must remain in the hands of the trial court.
The trial court should be required to set forth its reasons for selecting
the new forum (and for rejecting the others considered) on the record. Such
disclosure reduces the likelihood that the public will perceive the trial court
as partial in its selection of the new forum. Disclosure on the record would
also facilitate appellate review of the trial court's selection.
Finally, consideration of demographic factors should not become a tool -
for the criminal defendant to delay the trial. It should be impermissible for
a criminal defendant to be able to delay the trial by requesting time to
compile vast amounts of statistical information on each potential transferee
community. Judicial consideration of demographic factors should be
limited to statistical information which is readily available through
publications of the United States Census Bureau or similar compilations
available through state agencies.
VII. Conclusion
The trial of the officers accused of beating Rodney King prompted the
question: What role should demographic factors play in selecting a new site
for a criminal trial after a change of venue motion is granted? This
Comment suggests that the demographic characteristics of the new site
should be evaluated as one of several factors guiding the trial court's choice
of forum.
Although it appears that the Constitution does not mandate transfer to
a community of similar demographic composition, the question should not
be foreclosed. The selection of a new forum affects the public's perception
of the fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system. This is true
especially in high-publicity trials involving race-related crimes. Therefore,
trial courts should be required to evaluate the demographic characteristics
181. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that the public perceives that the racial composition of juries is important). See also supra note 7.
182. See discussion of New Jersey proposal, supra part V.A.
183. See supra notes 158-163 and accompanying text.
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of each potential new location for trial as part of the totality of
circumstances considered in selecting a new site for trial.
Michael A. Santivasci
